Green tech rivalry clouds German chancellor Merz's first China visit - analyst
Clean Energy Wire: Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s first official trip to China next week (24-26 February) comes at a time of heightened tensions with the US, both for Germany and for China. Do you expect the visit to signal a rapprochement between China and Germany – and, by extension, the EU?
Johanna Krebs: I don’t expect the relationship between China and Germany to warm significantly at this point. In my view, trade issues will dominate the agenda, for example regarding China’s export of rare earth elements, as Germany’s industry depends heavily on these imports.
Do you think climate and energy topics will play an important role?
Rare earth mineral exports of course also concern green technologies. But I don’t expect climate and energy topics to be explicitly placed on the agenda in this context or any other.
Export controls imposed by Beijing on rare earth minerals, tariffs on electric vehicles imposed by Brussels and other trade disputes have dominated relations between China and Europe lately. Do you think Merz’s trip will help resolve some of these issues? What kind of solution do you expect Germany's government to aim for?
Germany could claim success if it achieves an outcome that goes beyond the current Busan Agreement reached between Washington and Beijing, which has been extended to the EU – but only until it expires in October. However, I don’t expect Merz’s trip to yield any long-term solutions in this respect.
The US under president Donald Trump is increasingly isolating itself on the international stage with its retreat from global climate action and its national rollback of domestic climate legislation. Do you think this could lead to a stronger Europe-China axis on international climate action, leaving the US without a say on key questions?
With its exit from the Paris Climate Agreement, the US has chosen to largely stay out of international climate policy. But this does not necessarily mean that the EU and China will deepen their cooperation, as industrial competition in green technologies is too intense to not affect climate policy.
Measures such as carbon pricing, in particular the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), will, however, affect emissions in third countries, including China.
In security policy, Germany and China have a rather ambiguous relationship: on the one hand, both advocate for a rules-based order and open markets. On the other hand, China has been a reliable supporter of Russia’s war effort in Eastern Europe against Ukraine, meaning it indirectly acts as an adversary of EU security interests. What effect does this have on relations?
The relationship between China on the one side and Germany and the EU on the other is indeed ambiguous - but this is also true within the EU itself. There is no united position vis-à-vis China, neither among member states nor between national governments and the European Commission.
The same applies within individual member states. In Germany, for example, there are major differences between industry and the government in how risks posed by China are assessed. China can exploit these divergences by pursuing separate negotiations with different actors. If the EU wants to improve its relationship with China in the long run, it will first need to develop common expectations and a united strategy for engagement.