Preview 2026: Far-right may pose growing risk to transition as Germany heads into key regional elections – political scientist
***This interview is part of a series with experts to preview energy and climate policy developments in Germany and Europe in 2026.***
Clean Energy Wire: The popularity of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in polls ahead of five state elections in 2026 is fuelling a debate in chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative camp of the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) over how to deal with the far-right party. What do you think is this doing to the climate policy debate in the country?
Janine Patz: Germany and many other wealthy societies currently see the rise of anti-democratic nationalistic forces. These are based on an ideology that, at its core, rejects the concept of global responsibility and global solutions – an outlook that strongly shapes the climate debate. The AfD denies that manmade climate change is a global crisis that can be influenced by political action. Following this logic, climate action is portrayed not only as ineffective, but as an ideological project that is detrimental to the people, destructive for the economy, perilous for prosperity, and damaging for the environment.
The party argues that climate change itself is not what threatens the homeland (Heimat), livelihoods and the economy, but climate policies do. Despite the so-called ‘firewall’ rhetoric [the conservative CDU/CSU alliance’s internal policy of rejecting any cooperation with the far right], we see that extreme-right positions are becoming mainstreamed, not only in immigration policy but also in climate policy.
This includes normalising the idea of “Green policies” as a bogeyman, a narrative long championed by the AfD. As a result, debates about climate action increasingly have become less fact-based and more antagonistic. Disinformation and populism are fuelling fear and defensive reactions. A case in point is the discourse around the Building Energy Act (“heating law”), which was originally adopted [under a CDU/CSU-led government] in 2020 and was then reformed under the previous tripartite coalition government [including the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party, and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP)].
What concrete consequences for climate policy in Germany could follow from a significant success of the AfD in some state elections, for example in Saxony-Anhalt, a rural eastern state where the party currently leads the polls by a wide margin?
Analyses show that the broad acceptance for measures across the population that we still had in 2022 is fading. Irrespective of upcoming state elections and the debates over how to deal with the party, the AfD already today is a political force with strong influence at the local level, particularly in rural areas. These are precisely the regions where many concrete measures linked to the expansion of renewable energy are being implemented. The party already threatens transformation at this level and undermines democratic cohesion. Increased political influence at the state and federal level will only intensify this trend and, in a worst-case-scenario, make democratic procedures unviable.
In the competition for voters, the political discourse is shifting in the far-right party’s favour. If other parties fail to clearly distance themselves from its positions, this only strengthens the AfD. The party’s disinformation campaigns and its dystopic narratives have to be countered with facts and credible visions for the future. Irrespective of its necessity, a social-ecological transformation offers a significant potential to improve health, prosperity, economic growth, nature conservation, freedom, and fairness for future generations.
What would you say has the government of chancellor Merz got right so far in terms of climate and energy policy?
The government has confirmed its adherence to the national climate targets: to reduce emissions by 65 percent by 2030 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2045. The 2045 target has now also been enshrined in the constitution.
Another positive element is the 100-billion-euro special fund for infrastructure and climate neutrality. This fund was made a prerequisite by the Green Party for its consent ahead of the new government taking office. While special the fund only covers a fraction of the required investments, it strengthens the separate Climate and Transformation Fund (KTF), which is designed to cover climate action measures outside the regular budget.
And where do you see the government falling short?
Despite these commitments, climate action is currently taking a back seat to traditional industrial policy. At the current pace, Germany will miss its 2045 target by a wide margin. This shift in priorities was already evident during the 2025 election campaign, when the previous government’s climate policy was framed as “ideological” and damaging for the economy, prosperity, and individual liberty.
Individual climate action measures have been called into question, and in some cases are withdrawn. At the same time, the concept of “technology openness” is being used to justify both continued reliance on fossil fuel technologies and future solutions that are not yet suitable for large-scale deployment. Instead of focussing on concrete procedures to significantly reduce CO2 emissions, emissions trading is increasingly presented as the primary solution.
As a result, the energy transition is being significantly slowed down, and existing climate targets are being systematically called into question.
In your view, which topics will become relevant in climate and energy policy in 2026.
It will be crucial to ensure that all the money earmarked in the Climate and Transformation Fund [CTF] is actually used to reduce CO2emissions. Using the money instead for industry relief, for financing fossil infrastructure, or for payments for missed climate targets would contradict Germany’s climate interests and come at the expense of implementing concrete measures, for example at the municipal level. Attempts to shift the financing of such measures from the core federal budget to the CTF fund have already been criticised by experts as misappropriation.
What consequences should the government draw from this?
We need to advance ecologic transformation processes with the resources currently available. There is urgent need for action in industry, in agriculture, in sustainable mobility, the heating transition or the expansion of renewable power sources. It would be sensible to earmark part of the funds for social measures and targeted relief to low-income households. If these investments are not made now, society will pay twice - through payments for missed EU targets and through the growing impacts of unchecked climate change.
At present, however, we are seeing a rollback of existing regulation, for example in the heating and mobility sectors. Clinging to combustion engine cars or fossil heating systems reduces planning certainty for companies and consumers. In the medium term, this will push Germany’s climate targets further out of reach and create competitive disadvantages.
Instead, the benefits and enormous potential of a social-ecological transformation need to be addressed and its acceptance strengthened. The necessary changes require social cohesion and democratic consensus. These challenges can be tackled collectively. By contrast, sticking to outdated modes of production and consumption will ultimately lead to a loss of economic strength, prosperity, and liberty.
Looking back, it becomes clear that incentives alone cannot replace regulation. Clear rules provide the planning certainty needed for transformation. Without regulation in the past, we would still have cars without catalytic converters, spray cans emitting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), or buildings containing asbestos. These regulatory interventions have improved life in every respect.
